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CYBERATTACK ATTRIBUTION MATTERS
UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER
“[N]onstate actors . . . are able to organize into . . . networks . . . more
readily than [] traditional, hierarchical, state actors . . . . [W]hoever
masters the network form stands to gain the advantage.”1

INTRODUCTION
Day 1: An anonymous online group posts a message instructing the
United States (“U.S.”) to close all overseas bases within six days or
else suffer destruction of major U.S. infrastructure.
Day 6: Twenty-two hydroelectric dams and power plants along the
West Coast are remotely shut down, severing electricity and phone service throughout the western United States. Thirty-five deaths are reported in one day, ranging from traffic accidents to heart attacks and
heatstroke among the elderly. Reports emerge that an unpowered dam
in California broke, killing thousands.
Day 9: The U.S. air-traffic control system is sabotaged, freezing radar
screens and scrambling information among close-flying planes. After a
midair collision kills almost 500 people, all commercial flights are
grounded. Economic loss from the groundings amounts to billions daily.
Day 12: A computer-controlled chemical factory in Detroit blows up,
destroying the eastern half of the city. After reviewing circumstantial
evidence, the military suspects Russia and China are the masterminds.
Both countries deny any involvement.
Day 20: The United States retaliates physically while covert cyberattacks shut down both Russian and Chinese power grids. Oil pipelines in
both countries are disrupted. Transportation, financial and power systems are shut down, causing immeasurable economic damage. Reports
indicate that the number of Russian and Chinese deaths far outnumber
those suffered in the United States.
Day 25: After the attacks subside, U.S. Information Warfare Command
obtains user identification data from the West Coast attacks. The data is
traced back to civilian-led liberation groups in the Republic of Abkhazia. Attackers merely routed strikes through Russian and Chinese networks to provide the illusion of hostility toward the United States.

1. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security,
10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 76 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law]
(quoting David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,
6
FIRST
MONDAY
10,
Oct.
2001),
available
at
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/889/798.
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Day 26: In a public apology to Russia and China, the President says,
“We are all victims.” That may be, but it seems the people of both nations have paid a higher price for the United States’ mistake.2

This is the new reality. Cyberattacks and information-systems warfare
are no longer fictional concepts posing as a concern for some far-off
generation.3 Private, public, and military systems infrastructures are vulnerable to cyberattacks worldwide.4 Attacks are not limited to the United
States, as a great number of countries have been targeted.5 Many of the

2. John Arquilla, The Great Cyberwar of 2002, WIRED (Feb. 1998),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/6.02/cyberwar_pr.html.
3. Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information Age?,
22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 223, 226 (2000).
4. For example, Google’s password system was the target of a cyberattack in January 2010 that resulted in the theft of Google’s intellectual property. Jonathan Stempel,
Google Cyber Attack Hit Password System: Report, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63J0BO20100420. In 2009, cyberspies infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid and implanted programs that could disrupt the system. Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html. The United States’ military
network of “2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks (LANs) . . . are probed
by outsiders about five hundred times a day.” Aldrich, supra note 3, at 228–29 (citing
Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38, 39).
5. See Robert Coalson, Behind The Estonia Cyber Attacks, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO
LIBERTY (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyber attacks/1505613.html (discussing the 2007 cyberattack that blocked Estonia’s websites,
paralyzing the country’s Internet infrastructure and freezing bank cards and cellular
phone networks); see also Associated Press, A Look at Estonia’s Cyber Attack in 2007
(July 8, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246 (“Experts said hundreds of
thousands of computers were used in a coordinated attack against government agencies
and banks.”); Matthew Weaver, Cyber Attackers Target South Korea and US,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 8, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8139821.stm
(discussing the cyberattack against South Korea’s presidential Blue House, defense ministry, national assembly, Shinhan bank, and Korea Exchange bank); Dan Goodin, Georgian Cyber Attacks Launched by Russian Crime Gangs, THE REGISTER (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/08/18/georgian_cyber_attacks/ (The cyberattack,
which targeted e-commerce sites and Georgian government sites, “coincided with the
Russian military’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008.”). It is not just the United States
that fears cyberattacks from actors based in foreign countries. According to a 2009 McAfee survey, a plurality of global companies fear cyberattacks from U.S.-based actors more
than foreign-based actors. See Robert Lemos, Cyber Attacks from U.S. “Greatest Concern,” SECURITYFOCUS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.securityfocus.com/print/brief/1066
(“The survey found that 36 percent ranked network attacks from the United States as their
“greatest concern,” compared to 33 percent most concerned about attacks from China.
Russia came in a distant third, with only 12 percent of those polled rating it the most
concerning.”). For the report based on the study, see Stewart Baker, Shaun Waterman &
George Ivanov, In the Crossfire: Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Cyber War,
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actors executing or participating in these attacks will be nonstate, and in
extreme cases, stateless.6
Attribution is the means by which responsibility for illegal acts or
omissions are attached to the state.7 Vincent-Joël Proulx8 described the
need for eliminating the concept of international state attribution and
holding a state strictly liable if it fails to prevent terrorists from launching
an attack within its borders.9 Although this seems contradictory to the
United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter, Proulx argued that this notion is in fact
supported by the international community’s objective of eradicating terrorism.10
MCAFEE,
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-in-crossfire-criticalinfrastructure-cyber-war.pdf (last visited on Dec. 21, 2010).
6. Ronfeldt & Arquilla, supra note 1.
7. Amanda Tarzwell, Note, In Search of Accountability: Attributing the Conduct of
Private Security Contractors to the United States Under the Doctrine of State Responsibility, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L 179, 192 (2009).
8. Proulx received LL.L. and LL.B. degrees from the University Ottawa and an
LL.M. in International Legal Studies at New York University School of Law. Former
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS &
LEGAL
PLURALISM,
Clerks,
MCGILL CTR.
http://www.mcgill.ca/humanrights/clinical/clerkships/formerclerks/ (last visited Dec. 21,
2010). Proulx is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in international law at McGill University. Id. Proulx’s dissertation surveys the relationship between international state responsibility and terrorism, with a focus on human rights and international relations. Id.
9. Vincent-Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for
Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615, 643–53 (2005). It
should be noted that there is no international agreement as to the definition of terrorism.
Id. at 647; see also Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as
Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1030–41 (2004) (discussing
“terrorism” as having an international nature). Determining what constitutes cyber terrorism is particularly difficult. See Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 382–
405 (2007) [hereinafter Brenner, Attribution and Response]. Professor Brenner, in short,
defines cybercrime and cyberterrorism as the use of computer technology to commit a
crime or engage in terrorist activity, respectively. Id. at 382, 386. Although terrorism is
thought of as a type of crime, Professor Brenner distinguishes those concepts in that
“crime is personal while terrorism is political.” Id. at 387. She then distinguishes cyberterrorism from cyberwarfare in that terrorism is intended to “demoralize a civilian population,” while warfare is “not supposed to target civilians.” Id. at 387–88.
10. Proulx, supra note 9, at 643–53. On September 12, 2001, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling for “international cooperation to prevent and eradicate
acts of terrorism” and holding “those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts . . . accountable.” Id. (quoting G.A.
Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 1st mtg. U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/1 (2001)). The U.N.
Charter is a treaty signed and ratified by 192 states with the express purposes of “maintain[ing] international peace and security, . . . [and] develop[ing] friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 1, para.
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Attributing responsibility to a state for an attack is guided by two diverging concepts—direct and indirect responsibility.11 Under direct responsibility, a state may be held liable if its direct act or omission led to
harm, if a group or actor acts as a state agent, or if a state has “control”
over a nonstate actor.12 Indirect responsibility is more opaque and appears when there is no underlying link between an actor and a state.13
Assigning direct liability for an attack is difficult if a state has no ties to
terrorist activities occurring in its territory.14 As such, the indirect liability analysis shifts to a focus on the host-state’s duty to prevent terrorist
attacks from emanating from within its territory.15 A state’s apathy or
disregard for terrorist activity within its territory triggers its responsibility as though it had directly participated in the attack.16 Given the enorm-

1, 2. Furthermore, the U.N. Charter requires members to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security . . . are
not endangered.” Id. art. 2, para. 3.
11. Proulx, supra note 9, at 623–26. Proulx refers to this as the “direct/indirect dichotomy.” Id. at 623.
12. Id. at 624; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (holding a state legally
responsible for the acts of nonstate actors if it had “effective control” over them); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, I.C.T.Y. App. Ch., at 49 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter
Tadic] (holding a state legally responsible for the acts of organized armed groups when
the state had “overall control” over them). As Professor Proulx points out, “the issues
surrounding direct state responsibility are relatively clear and require no further discussion here.” Proulx, supra note 9, at 624.
13. Id. at 624. Professor Proulx’s notion of indirect responsibility is consistent with
the concept of “vicarious responsibility.” Id. at n.43; see also Davis Brown, Use of Force
Against Terrorism After September 11th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other
Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2003) (“The difference between [direct] responsibility and vicarious responsibility is that in the former, responsibility flows
from the injurious acts, and in the latter, responsibility flows from the failure to take
measures to prevent or punish the act.”).
14. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624.
15. Id. The focus of the analysis is still whether the state breached an international
obligation. However, under indirect responsibility the breach will likely consist of an
omission, intentional or unintentional, as opposed to an act. Id.; see, e.g., John Bellinger,
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, Address
Before the London School of Economics (Oct. 31, 2006), in 8 GERMAN L.J. 735, 739
(2007) (“As a practical matter . . . a state must be responsible for preventing terrorists
from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. And, as a legal matter, where a
state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the targeted state to use military
force in self-defense to address that threat.”).
16. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624; see also DANIEL BYMAN, DEADLY CONNECTIONS:
STATES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM 219 (2005) (noting the “great[] contribution a state
can make to a terrorist’s cause [by] not act[ing] against it”).
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ous impact nonstate actors have on international peace, such a broadening of state responsibility is not unreasonable.17
State responsibility depends on attribution.18 Attribution is not only a
necessary factor in determining whether a state has violated international
law, it is also used to determine whether a victim-state may take action
against the perpetrating state.19 Nonstate actors, whose nature and class
place them outside the definition of a state, increasingly perform modern
acts of aggression.20 By expanding states’ duties to monitor and restrain
nonstate actors, the international community permits imposing liability
on states for failing to prevent acts not traditionally attributable to
them.21
This Note theorizes that, within the ambit of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism, the concept of state attribution must not be eliminated. Not only
must cyberattack attribution remain in place, it should be reinforced and
enhanced through increased state cooperation and collaboration. The Internet provides virtually everybody with the opportunity to disguise
one’s online persona, erase one’s digital tracks, and transfer evidence
onto innocent computers.22 In order to ensure that it is not retaliating
against an innocent state, a victim-state must correctly attribute an attack
to the actual attacker. Identifying a cyberattacker is essential to determining the nature of an attack.23 Determining the nature of an attack is generally the first step in developing a response, whether it is political, domestic, or military, to ensure that it does not violate Article 51 of the
17. Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare
with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F.L. REV. 65, 89 (2009); see also Anne Petitpierre,
Vice-President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Opening Address at the Bruges Colloquium: Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors (Oct. 30,
2002), available at http://www.cicr.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5f8jez.htm (“In all
areas of international relations—economics, ecology, politics, military affairs—non-State
actors, be they infra- or supra-State, have assumed increasing importance and have asserted themselves as international players that cannot be ignored.”).
18. Berglind Halldorsdottir Birkland, Note, Reining in Non-State Actors: State Responsibility and Attribution in Cases of Genocide, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2009).
19. Id. at 1630–31; see also Jorn Greibel & Milan Plucken, New Developments Regarding the Rules of Attribution? The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Bosnia
v. Serbia, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 601, 604 (2008) (explaining that state attribution leads to
significant consequences, in particular, that “the victim state [may also] take measures in
reaction to the violation”).
20. Michael Anderson, Note, Reconceptualizing Aggression, 60 DUKE L.J. 411, 411
(2010).
21. Birkland, supra note 18, at 1626.
22. Meiring de Villers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: A
Forensic Analysis, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 419, 459–60 (2008).
23. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 405.
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U.N. Charter.24 As such, attribution is an issue that should not be circumvented.
Part I of this Note examines Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter
and the evolution of international jurisprudence attributing legal responsibility to a state for the acts of nonstate actors, as it is important to understand how states became responsible for the acts of nonstate actors.
Part II will analyze the inherent difficulties in determining the identity
and location of a cyberattacker, the nature of a cyberattack, and why state
attribution in the cyberattack context is a necessary part of the analysis.
Part III will consider increased state cooperation and collaboration as a
means of reinforcing attribution.
I. THE U.N. CHARTER ON USE OF FORCE AND THE RIGHT TO SELFDEFENSE
After World War II, world leaders created the U.N. in an attempt to fashion an international legal system that would foster enduring peace.25
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, the U.N.’s founding document, addresses
the standards by which member states pursue international peace and
security.26 In particular, Article 2(4) completely limits a state’s ability to
use unilateral force,27 stating “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”28 This seemingly
total repudiation of force, however, is balanced by an important exception, the well-settled principle of the right of self-defense.29
A. The Self-Defense Doctrine under Article 51
Article 51 provides that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”30 Although Article 51 permits individual self24. Id.
25. Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use
of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 215 (2002).
26. Id. at 216.
27. Id.
28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
29. Jensen, supra note 25, at 216. Another important exception exists to Article 2(4)’s
repudiation of force: collective military action authorized by the U.N. Security Council.
Id. This exception is outside the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
30. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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defense, it is limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality.31
Necessity refers to the requirement of self-defense under the circumstances because settlement or resolution could not be acquired by peaceful
means.32 On the other hand, proportionality limits self-defense actions to
“the amount of force necessary to defeat an ongoing attack or to deter
future aggression.”33 The doctrines of necessity and proportionality are
considered to be customary standards that states responding in selfdefense need to abide by.34
The self-defense doctrine’s core principle is that a state may only act in
self-defense in response to an “armed attack.”35 This concept is a widely
accepted foundation in international law. However, the quantity and
31. Jensen, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Nicaragua, supra note 12).
32. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyber Attacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (citing YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND
SELF-DEFENSE 87, 237 (4th ed. 2005)); see also Ian Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity” in
International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counterterrorism, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337 (2005).
33. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 32–33 (citing Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies
in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 532 (2003)).
34. Gina Heathcote, Article 51 Self-Defense as a Narrative: Spectators and Heroes in
International Law, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 135 (2005). The concept of proportionality requires that defensive actions are limited to the region of the armed attack and
not beyond the termination of conflict. Id. Proportionality should be viewed in terms of
the defensive military campaign as a whole, rather than in terms of the difference of hostilities. Id. at 136.
35. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 31. Whether a cyberattack can constitute an “armed
attack” is an issue beyond the scope of this Note, but is important enough to warrant a
brief discussion. In order to determine what constituted an international armed conflict
under Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Jean Pictet determined force
of “sufficient scope, duration, and intensity” is deemed an armed attack. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 90 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As international law has evolved, three models have
arisen that apply Pictet’s criteria to modern uses of force. Id. at 91. The first is an “instrument-based approach” which assesses whether the harm produced by the cyberattack
could only have been previously caused by a physical attack. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The second is an “effects-based approach” which only considers the
overall effect of the cyberattack on the victim state. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Relation to a physical attack is not considered at all in the effects-based approach.
Id. The third approach is one of “strict liability” which automatically deems any cyberattack against “critical national infrastructure” as an armed attack. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). While these various approaches have been widely debated, all three
models agree with the conclusion that a cyberattack can be deemed as an armed attack.
Id. at 91–92; see also Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 185–87
(2006).
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quality of force required to constitute an armed attack has been the subject of ongoing debate.36 This classification problem is likely exacerbated
by the fact that neither the U.N. Charter nor the U.N.’s Definition of Aggression resolution37 actually defines armed attacks.38 This debate becomes quite nuanced as it pertains to cyberattacks, which are often
viewed as “a use of force short of armed force.”39
Although the definition of armed attacks under Article 51 is open to
debate, it is clear that states invoking the doctrine of self-defense have
prepared for armed attack by states, not nonstate or private actors, since
the drafting of the Charter.40 Article I of the Definition of Aggression41
36. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 31. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the
Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41
(2002).
37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). An express purpose of the U.N. Charter is to “take . . .
effective . . . measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
peace.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The 1974 Definition of Aggression was an attempt by
the U.N. General Assembly to provide normative guidance to the U.N. Security Council
as to what constitutes an act of aggression. Sergey Sayapin, A Great Unknown: The Definition of Aggression Revisited, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 377, 377–78 (2009). However, the
definition was not binding on U.N. Member States and had no apparent impact on the
Security Council. Id. at 378. Recently, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was
given jurisdiction over the undefined crime of aggression provided that the definition is
consistent with the norms of the U.N. Charter. Id.
38. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 52–54.
39. Id. at 31. Information warfare creates serious problems in the distinction between
use of force and mere coercion under Article 2(4). Jason Barkham, Information Warfare
and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 84 (2001).
Including all types of information warfare and cyberattacks would require an enormous
expansion of Article 2(4). Id. Such an expansion would require international law to determine whether electronic incursions that may not necessarily create physical damage,
but have significant economic and political effects, are substantial enough to constitute a
use of force. Id. at 84–85. Professor Michael Schmitt proposed a framework that attempts
to answer the question of whether cyberattacks constitute armed force or simply mere
coercion. Id. at 85. Professor Schmitt believes we should evaluate the cyberattack using
six criteria: severity, immediacy, indirectness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy. Id.; see also Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of
Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 929–32 (1999). Once a cyberattack is determined to be an armed
attack, the right to self-defense under Article 51 would be triggered. Barkham, supra note
39, at 85.
40. This scope of planning persisted since the drafting of the Charter. Yutaka AraiTakahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence—Appraising the Impact of
the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAW. 1081, 1087 (2002).
41. “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” Definition of Ag-
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provides that aggression can only derive from a state.42 Within the traditional jus ad bellum framework, the international community did not anticipate that nonstate actors would ascend to the level of a state capable
of initiating an armed attack against another state.43
B. The Evolution of Attributing State Responsibility to Private Acts
Prior to the paradigm shift spurred by 9/11, states were not held legally
responsible for the acts of nonstate or private actors.44 Only acts by
branches or entities of a state were held attributable to that state.45 International law, however, did recognize the principle that a state can be
bound by the actions of private persons, but only if those persons qualify
as “agents” of the state.46 International jurisprudence evolved to hold a
state responsible for the acts of nonstate actors if the state exercised effective or overall control over the actors, then advanced to hold a state
indirectly responsible if the state failed to prevent attacks from originating within its territory.
1. The “Effective Control” Test
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) addressed whether the United States was responsible for the financing and
support of contras operating in the Nicaragua-El Salvador conflict.47
gression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14,
1974).
42. Aria-Takahashi, supra note 36, at 1087.
43. Id. The law of armed force is governed by two bodies of law: just ad bellum, the
law governing recourse to force, and just in bello, the law governing conduct of hostilities. Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM U. INT’L L. REV.
311, 311 (2008). Both principles are based in the moral justification for warfare and are
intertwined with the just or unjust cause of recourse of force. Id. at 346.
44. Proulx, supra note 9, at 619.
45. Id. at 619–20.
46. Id. at 620. “Since the publication of Professor Bowett’s Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, international courts have formally adopted this concept of attribution.” Id.; see also D. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1 (1972).
47. René Värk, State Responsibility for Private Armed Groups in the Context of Terrorism,
JURIDICA
INT’L
XI
184,
188
(2006),
available
at
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2006_1_184.pdf. The U.S. consistently
opposed Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, a leftist political party with “close relations
with the Soviet Union and Cuba,” in Nicaragua. Davis B. Tyner, Internationalization of
War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Folly in Tadic, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 843, 850 (2006). The U.S. used various methods to undermine the regime, including cutting off aid, starting a trade embargo,
and financing and supporting counter-revolutionary forces, including contras. Id. The
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Even though it was clear that the rebels were a “proxy army” of the United States, and at times were “completely dependent on the United States’
support,”48 the ICJ refused to attribute responsibility to the United
States.49 The ICJ determined that:
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying or equipping of the contras, the
selection of . . . targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation,
is still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras . . . . For this conduct to
give rise to legal personality of the United States, it would in principle
have to be proved that the State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed.50

In order to establish state responsibility under the Nicaragua decision,
one must prove that state agents “participated in the planning, direction,
support[,] and execution” of armed operations.51 Thus, it became customary to analyze the level of effective control exercised by the agents of
one state over the private actors of another state in order to determine the
level of responsibility to attribute to the host-state.52
2. The “Overall Control” Test
Over a decade after the Nicaragua decision, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Appeals Chamber faced a
similar issue in Prosecutor v. Tadic.53 Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, participated
in “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims in 1992.54 The issue in Tadic’s
appeal was whether “Bosnian Serbs constitute[d] a State” or whether

Nicaraguan government opposed the U.S. support of contras and argued that they were de
facto agents of the U.S. Id.
48. Proulx, supra note 9, at 620.
49. Värk, supra note 47, at 188.
50. Id. (quoting Nicaragua, supra note 12).
51. Värk, supra note 47, at 189 (quoting Nicaragua, supra note 11).
52. Proulx, supra note 9, at 621.
53. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, I.C.T.Y. App. Ch., at 49 (July 15,
1999).
54. Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, Prosecutro v. Tardic (Judgement), 94, 3 AM. J.
INT’L L. 571, 571 (2000). Tadic was a former café owner who became involved in Serb
Nationalism. Tyner, supra note 47, at 854. During the war in the Balkan Islands, Tadic
reportedly ran a prison camp where he allegedly beat and murdered several prisoners. Id.
The ICTY prosecuted Tadic as an agent of the state and convicted him of several offenses, including crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Id.
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“[they] were organs or agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”55
In rejecting the ICJ’s effective control test, the Appeals Chamber ruled
that overall control of a military organization is adequate to attribute
state responsibility to “all acts of the organization.”56
The Tadic court made an important distinction between military organized groups and non-military organized groups.57 The former has a
structure, chain of command, strict sets of rules to which members must
conform, and is subject to the authority of the group’s leader.58 Thus to
attribute responsibility to the host-state, the state would have to wield
control of the group overall by equipping, financing, and coordinating or
helping in the planning of its military activity.59 For non-military groups,
the threshold was even higher, requiring “specific instructions” to be delivered from the state to the group.60
The key difference between the Nicaragua and Tadic cases is degree
of control—that is, the ICTY requires control beyond financing and
equipping forces and should, but does not necessarily, include planning
and supervision of military operations.61 Importantly, the ICTY in Tadic
focused on individual responsibility, distinguishing the case from Nicaragua, which focused on state responsibility.62 After all, the Tadic court
believed state responsibility should be based on a “realistic concept of
responsibility.”63
3. Other International Jurisprudence and the Shift towards Indirect Responsibility
Although Nicaragua and Tadic are the seminal cases evidencing the
shift towards state responsibility over private action, other international
jurisprudence can be instructional as well. Nicaragua and Tadic focus on
the concept of direct responsibility—where a militarized group acts as an
agent of the state or where the state retroactively endorses the act.64 The
55. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 54, at 572. The issue in Tadic was whether international human rights law applied, not state responsibility. James Crawford, Human Rights
and State Responsibility 1, 5 (12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture
Series, Univ. of Conn., 2009).
56. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 54, at 572.
57. Proulx, supra note 9, at 621.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Alternatively, the non-military group standard could be met if the host-state
approved of or endorsed the act ex post facto. Id. at 621–22.
61. Värk, supra note 47, at 189.
62. Crawford, supra note 55, at 5.
63. Värk, supra note 47, at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624.
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issue becomes more complicated when there is no causal link between
the host-state and the actor—where states have no knowledge or control
over organizations within their boundaries.65 The only link between the
two entities is that they both happen to operate in the same territory.66
1923’s Tellini incident foreshadowed the trend away from the traditional jus ad bellum framework towards the notion of indirect state responsibility for internal private actors.67 While overseeing the delineation
of the Greek-Albanian border, several members of an international commission were assassinated on Greek territory.68 Although the League of
Nations did not hold Greece legally responsible for the assassination,69 it
opined that “responsibility of a State is only involved by the commission
in its territory of a political crime against . . . foreigners if the State has
neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime
and the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice of the criminal.”70
United States v. Iran (the “Tehran Hostages Case”) takes the concept
of Tellini and indirect state responsibility one step further.71 In 1979, a
militant group attacked a U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Despite several
requests for help, no Iranian forces intervened.72 The Embassy was eventually invaded and the consular, staff, and visitors were taken hostage.73
Somewhat foreshadowing Tadic, the ICJ asked whether “the militants
acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by [an] organ of the
Iranian State to carry out a specific operation.”74 Finding no direct involvement, the ICJ then considered indirect involvement.75 The Court
believed “the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any ‘appropriate steps’ to protect the premises, staff and archives of the United
States’ mission against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion.”76

65. Id. at 624, 627.
66. Id. at 627.
67. Id. Following the assassination, the League of Nations formed a special committee to address the legal matters raised by the incident.
68. Crawford, supra note 55, at 4.
69. Proulx, supra note 9, at 627.
70. Crawford, supra note 55, at 4 (internal citation omitted).
71. See Tehran Hostages Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 64 (May 24) [hereinafter
Tehran].
72. Leo Gross, The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures, 74, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (1980).
73. Id.
74. Proulx, supra note 9, at 627.
75. Id. at 627–28.
76. Id. at 628 (quoting Tehran).
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The Tehran decision drew a clear boundary between direct responsibility
and indirect responsibility.77
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
The events of 9/11 served as a pivotal point in the development of contemporary indirect state responsibility.78 International law would not
support a military reprisal in Afghanistan solely against al Qaeda, as the
terrorist group was not the same as a state.79 The United States “sought to
impute al Qaeda’s conduct to Afghanistan simply because the Taliban
had harbored and supported the group.”80 After the events of 9/11, the
United States seemingly eliminated the distinction between direct and
indirect state responsibility.81
More than two weeks after 9/11, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1373.82 The resolution provides that “all States shall . . .
[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, . . . prevent the commission of
terrorist acts, . . . [and] deny safe haven to those who . . . support[] or
commit terrorist acts.”83 The United States made a case against the Tali77. Proulx, supra note 9, at 628. After the decision, it became clear that the initial
focus of the direct responsibility standard hinges on the individuals or groups involved
instead of the actions of the host-state. Id. The objective became establishing whether the
unlawful act or omission of the person or group was directly attributable to the state. Id.
78. Id. at 634. On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial
aircrafts, flew two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and the last
crashed in a Pennsylvania field. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2002). Approximately three thousand
people were killed in the incidents, the worst casualties the U.S. has experienced in a
single day since the American Civil War. Id. After the attacks, the U.S. suspected that the
hijackers were funded by a Saudi Arabian expatriate, Osama Bin Laden, and based in
Afghanistan working through his terrorist network, al Qaeda. Id. at 238.
79. Proulx, supra note 9, at 635.
80. Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 83, 89 (2003).
81. Proulx, supra note 9, at 636; see also TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE;
RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 218 (2006) (“Operation Enduring
Freedom was explicitly justified on the contentious claim that the act of harbouring terrorists is legally indistinguishable from the actual perpetration of terrorist acts.”).
82. Michael Wood, The Law on the Use of Force: Current Challenges, 11 SYBIL 1,
6 (2007); see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001).
83. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). For
more implications of Resolution 1373 and cyberwarfare, see Toby L. Friesen, Resolving
Tomorrow’s Conflicts Today: How New Developments Within the U.N. Security Council
can be Used to Combat Cyberwarfare, 58 NAVAL. L. REV. 89 (2009); see also Sumon
Dantiki, Power Through Process: An Administrative Law Framework For United Na-

1164

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:3

ban, claiming that it failed to prevent a terrorist attack that originated
within its boundaries and harbored al Qaeda members.84 Both the resolution and U.S. practice reinforced the international community’s new
commitment to fighting terrorism.85 As a result, the indirect responsibility standard has become the prevailing view in the area of attribution.86
II. ATTRIBUTION—GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE SELF-DEFENSE ANALYSIS
IS OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE
This section examines why attribution is a necessary part of the Article
51 right of self-defense analysis, despite the inherent difficulties of online attribution. Once an attack, online or kinetic, qualifies as an armed
attack, it seemingly gives the injured state the right to act in self-defense.
The issue of attributing responsibility of private actors to a state is a
complex issue within the realm of kinetic terrorism, but the nuances of
the doctrine become even more pronounced when an attack is strictly
electronic.
The relatively new standard of imputing state responsibility over private actors imposes a greater amount of force on states’ affirmative duty
to prevent their territory from becoming attackers’ sanctuaries.87 Traditionally, states were obligated to use due diligence to prevent criminal
acts within their territories directed at other nations.88 However, after the
events of 9/11 and the imposition of obligations within Resolution 1373,
states have a continual duty to prevent terrorist attacks from originating

tions Legislative Resolutions, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 655, 655 (2009) (arguing that Resolution 1373 created a binding obligation on states to reform domestic law in order to more
effectively fight international terrorism). Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council can impose binding resolutions on member states if necessary to maintain
peace and security. Peter Hulsroj, The Legal Function of the Security Council, 1 CHINESE
J. INT’L L. 59, 60 (2002). But see Lorraine Finlay, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions, 18 TUL. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 477 (2010) (discussing the implications of Security Council resolutions being
subject to judicial review).
84. Proulx, supra note 9, at 638.
85. Id. at 637–38.
86. Id. at 638. On Sept. 12, 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368
(2001) recognizing “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.” Wood, supra note 82, at 6. More than two weeks later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 (2001), which again reaffirmed “the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.” Id.
87. Graham, supra note 35, at 90.
88. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 42 (citing In re S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, 4, 88 (Moore, J., dissenting)).
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within their respective national boundaries.89 Thus, a state that has the
ability to prevent attacks and fails to do so ultimately fails to fulfill its
duty.90
In his 1995 article, Vincent-Joël Proulx advocates doing away with the
trans-substantive rule of attribution and shifting the entire model towards
strict liability.91 Proulx supports his argument largely on the basis international community’s intent on eliminating terrorism, the Security Council’s condemnation of terrorism, and its determination to “eliminate
threats to peace and security ‘by all necessary means.’”92 Proulx also argues that because the evidentiary standards required for attribution
present insurmountable barriers for injured states, strict liability should
be imposed on states that either did not or could not prevent a terrorist
attack from emanating within its borders.93 As such, Proulx believes that
circumventing the rule of attribution better serves the international com89. Graham, supra note 35, at 93. The duty generally consists of: (1) the enactment of
laws criminalizing international cyber attacks from within the national territory, (2) conducting thorough investigations into cyberattacks, (3) prosecuting those who have participated in international cyberattacks, and (4) cooperating with victim-states’ investigations and prosecutions of those involved. Id. at 93–94.
90. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 43 (internal citations omitted).
91. Proulx, supra note 9, at 643–56. It should be noted that Proulx’s theory of state
strict liability does not impose immediate absolute liability. Id. at 656. In order to avoid
abuse of weaker states, that is, developing countries that may not have the capabilities to
combat terrorism, Proulx would implement a two-tiered strict liability system. Id. Once
responsibility has been established on the host-state and the focus has shifted onto it, the
state will have an opportunity to prove how it has exhausted all available means to thwart
the terrorist attack. Id. at 657.
92. Id. at 643; see also Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of
Lethal Force When Operating Under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII
Mandate Authorising ‘All Necessary Means’, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 389 (2007)
(examining the use of lethal force under an “all necessary means” resolution). It is important to note that Proulx’s argument of circumventing attribution is largely grounded in
policy. He does not discuss the practical difficulties associated with circumventing the
rule. He does, however, analogize his theory of state strict liability to the domestic U.S.
law of products liability. Proulx, supra note 9, at 652–54. Within domestic products liability, manufacturers are often found strictly liable because public policy requires that
manufacturers be held accountable for their products’ quality. Id. at 653 (citing Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Company, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)). Referring to a state’s duty to
prevent, Proulx believes that governments are in a better position to thwart terrorist attacks from originating within their territory, just as manufacturers are more aware of
potentially hazardous products than the unwary consumer. Proulx, supra note 9, at 653.
“As with the Coke bottle manufacturer who has exclusive knowledge over the manufacturing process, the host-state is better positioned than the injured state to know, for example, what logistical, intelligence, police, and military means are at its disposal to eliminate the threat.” Id. at 655.
93. Id. at 643–57.

1166

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:3

munity’s interest in eradicating terrorism.94 While potential effectiveness
of circumventing attribution is not the focus of this Note, it is clear that
such a method is untenable within the rapidly growing realm of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism.
A. Attribution in the Cyberattack Context
Although states are under a continual, affirmative obligation to prevent
attacks from emanating from within their territory, the effectiveness of
prevention is limited as cyberattacks are extremely difficult to prevent.95
Attribution of an attack and characterizing the type of attack are imperative in the context of cyberattacks.96 Fundamentally, attribution ensures
that an injured state responding in self-defense does not target innocent
people or states.97 Attribution also plays a critical role in determining the
nature and character of an attack, which is the first step in developing a
lawful response, whether offensive or defensive.98 Attribution in the online context involves two issues: “attacker-attribution”—who is responsible for an attack—and “attack-attribution”—characterizing what kind
of attack it was.99
B. Attacker-Attribution: “Who Dun It?”
Identifying an online attacker is problematic because the methods we
use to identify kinetic attackers implicitly assume physically-based activity in the tangible world.100 Cyberattacks do not take place in the tangible
world, and as such, they do not display the characteristics common to

94. Id. at 643. Although outside the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note that in
his discussion of the strict liability model, it appears that Proulx appears to easily dismiss
the notion of infringing upon state sovereignty. Id. at 658–59. Proulx states that it is “desirable and more efficient” to sacrifice some sovereignty than fail to prevent widespread
death and terror. Id. at 659. For further discussion of the state sovereignty in the information age, see Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2004); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear
War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 192 (2009). “Despite the importance of state sovereignty, governments in the nineteenth century began to see the benefits of sacrificing some sovereignty in exchange for
increased predictability.” Jensen, supra note 25, at 214 (internal citation omitted).
95. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83; see also supra Part I.B.4.
96. Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure
in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 414 (2007).
97. Id.
98. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 405.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 409.
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their physical counterparts.101 In the physical world, determining attacker
liability often turns on a “place” where an attack emanated from or occurred.102 Places, however, tend to be much less conclusive in the context
of cyberattacks and online attribution.103
Determinations of attack origin are less conclusive in cyberattacks because the server location of an attack does not likely reflect the true location of origin.104 Cyberattackers commonly use “stepping stones”—
computers used by the cyberattacker but owned by ignorant parties—in
their attacks.105 While these stepping stones can be physically located
anywhere in the world, their physical location is irrelevant in cyberspace.106 For example, the use of Chinese servers in a cyberattack could
mean the attacks originated in China, or that the attackers were located in
Russia, Brazil, Pakistan, or anywhere else in the world and deliberately
used Chinese servers to mask the true origination point of the attack.107
Until investigators can reliably establish attack origination in real-space,
101. Id. In the physical world, attacker-attribution is far less problematic. Id. at 406. In
warfare, military attackers often wear distinct uniforms indicating their national affiliation and speak the language of their country of origin. Id. Criminal investigations often
focus on finding evidence at a physical crime scene. Id. at 407. For example, witnesses
may be able to identify the attacker and physical evidence, like DNA, can be traced to a
particular individual. Id. This method assumes that the attacker or perpetrator was, and
still is, physically located in the geographical area. Id. Terrorism occupies some middle
ground in between warfare and criminal investigations, with regard to attackerattribution. Id. Terrorists often identify themselves as representatives of a particular
group, generally so the group can take credit for the attack. Id. at 408; see also KIM
CRAGIN & SARA A. DALY, THE DYNAMIC TERRORIST THREAT, 37–38 (2004) (explaining
that the Real Irish Republican Army and Hamas generally take credit for attacks, while
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and al Qaeda do not). Sponsoring terrorist
groups often take credit for attacks in messages online or on videotapes delivered to the
media. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 408. In addition, terrorist
attacks may be attributed to a particular group based on the structure and style of the
attack. Id.
102. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The concept of geographical places is further distorted by “packet switching,”
in which packets of data travel the shortest electronic route to their destination. Condron,
supra note 96, at 409. The shortest electronic route, however, does not necessarily correspond to the shortest geographical route. Id. Data transfer relies on “existing network
traffic loads,” and therefore “shortest” corresponds more to time than geographic distance. Id.
106. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409.
107. Id. at 409–10; see, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 34, 34 (“In the world of cyberspying, locating the attackers’
country of origin is rare. China, in particular, is known for having poorly defended servers that outsiders from around the world commandeer as their unwitting launchpads.”).
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attacker-attribution is predicated on mere inferences.108 Even if cyberattacks are repeated over long periods of time, attacker-attribution would
still have to be drawn from inferences of what would appear to be the
same point of origin.109
Relying on inferences to identify the point of origin in cyberattacks introduces an element of ambiguity into the response calculus.110 Further,
an identified cyberattack origination point may be inconclusive, as essentially anyone has the ability to launch an anonymous transnational cyberattack.111 At most, inferential data regarding point of attack origin serve
merely as clues to attacker-attribution.112 Cyberspace eliminates law enforcement’s default assumption that an attacker is insular.113 It breaks a
crime scene into debris, making it extremely difficult to identify the point
of attack origin and link it to the attacker.114 At the very least, it may re108. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 410; see also Howard F. Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues, CARNEGIE MELLON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST. (Nov., 2002),
www.cert.org/archive/pdf/02sr009.pdf (discussing that the Internet was neither designed
for tracking and tracing users nor designed to resist untrustworthy users, and how today’s
high-threat environment far exceeds the Internet’s design parameters).
109. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 410; see, e.g., Eric Filiol,
Operational Aspects of Cyberwarfare or Cyber-Terrorist Attacks: What a Truly Devastating Attack Could Do, ESIEA—OPERATIONAL VIROLOGY & CRYPTOLOGY LABORATORY
(2009), http://www.esiea-recherche.eu/data/eciw09.pdf (discussing the main characteristics of a cyberattack: “not only the true origin of the attack must remain hidden, but also
must be possible to wrongly frame an innocent party (another country or group) as the
perpetrator of the attack (fooling the digital evidence). From a military perspective, the
main interest is to avoid or to delay the target reaction by misleading it.”).
110. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 412.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 414. However, as terrorism migrates online, the point of origin may gain
more importance in attacker-attribution. For example, in 1994, employees at the Rome
Air Development Center, the U.S. Air Force’s R&D facility in upstate New York, discovered that their computer systems had been hacked. Id. The Air Force, Secret Service,
and FBI found that the attackers routed their attacks through several computers in multiple countries. Id. at 414–15. With the assistance of Scotland Yard, the investigators
identified two adolescents as the attackers. Id. at 415; see also RICHARD POWER,
TANGLED WEB: TALES OF DIGITAL CRIME FROM THE SHADOWS OF CYBERSPACE 65–75
(2000) (detailing the events of the Rome Labs scenario and what led to the capture of the
teen cyberattackers—Datastream Cowboy and Kuji).
113. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 415. In real-space crime and
terrorism, a localized crime scene becomes the focus of the investigation. Id. at 417. Evidence, witnesses, and connections give the scene a comprehensible focus and make it a
manageable task. Id. In cyberspace, however, anyone can anonymously launch an attack
from any point connected to the Internet and repeat the attacks with a frequency not possible in the real-world. Id. at 418.
114. Id.

2011]

CYBERATTACK ATTRIBUTION MATTERS

1169

sult in false positives, leading the investigators to assume that an intermediary stepping stone is the originating point of a cyberattack.115
The issue of attacker-attribution remains the same even if the origination point is traced back to a state that sponsors terrorism.116 A point of
attack origin located in terrorist state would still be inconclusive—the
state may or may not have participated in the attack.117 On the other
hand, the fact that a cyberattack does not originate from a terrorist state
does not mean that the state was not involved in the attack.118 While it
may be tempting, perhaps even convenient, to implicate a terrorist state
from the mere appearance that it launched a cyberattack, they are no exception to the lack of clarity in attacker-attribution.
Ultimately, the mere fact that an extraterritorial cyberattack appears to
have been launched from a particular state cannot support the conclusion
that either state or nonstate actors launched the attack from within that
state.119 The physical limitations of the real world make it reasonable to
draw inferences to link an attack to an attacker.120 The absence of those
limitations on the Internet makes it exceedingly difficult to predicate
similar inferences to a cyberattack.121 As such, any inferences made from
the point of attack origin or from the victim-state cannot sustain a conclusion of direct or indirect state responsibility.122
C. Attack-Attribution: “What Is It?”
Determining the identity of a cyberattacker or cyberterrorist will likely
be closely associated with determining the nature of an attack, or “attack115. Id. This could have happened in the Rome Labs example. Id. Investigators originally tracked the hackers to an ISP in New York City and to a group of hackers whose
members were convicted of unlawful intrusion crimes in years earlier. Id. Given their
geographical connection to the hackers, it would have been logical for the investigators to
assume that the ISP was the point of attack origin. Id. at 418–19. In addition, it is important to note that the investigators were unable to track the hackers back to the point of
attack origin through online or electronic means. Id. at 419. They did it the old fashioned
way—with informants. Id.
116. Id. at 423.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 427.
120. Id. at 428. For example, an attacker gaining entry to a house protected by an
alarm system by using the correct alarm code suggests that the attacker knew the victim.
Id. A burgled jewelry store or bank with an uncompromised safe suggests that the perpetrator was an employee, former employee, or someone who the employee shared the
safe’s code with. Id. In both cases, investigators can infer with a high degree of certainty
as to who performed the attack and where. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 429.
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attribution.”123 Like attacker-attribution, online attack-attribution is inherently more problematic than real-world attack-attribution.124 However,
identifying the nature or character of a cyberattack is the first step in evaluating whether it qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51 and ensuring that any response functions within the limitations of necessity and
proportionality.125 The overarching problem with online attackattribution is that it is difficult to determine the nature of the attack because the indicators we must rely on—point of attack origin, point of
occurrence, and motive—develop an inherent ambiguity not present in
the real-world.126 This is because cyberspace makes it possible for anyone with an Internet connection to launch an attack on another computer
in another country.127
A response strategy is predicated on the premise that a state can know,
or quickly determine, what kind of attack it was subject to and what is
needed to neutralize the attackers.128 This is complicated by states’ general allocation of response authority for crime and terrorism to law en-

123. Id.
124. Id. at 433–34. According to Professor Brenner, real-world attacks fall into two
categories: crime/terrorism and warfare. Id. at 431. Crime usually involves civilians inflicting certain types of harm on each other—for example, murder, rape, assault, fraud—
and is generally limited in scale due to the constraints of physical reality. Id. For example, a mugger robs one victim, a rapist assaults one victim, a murder kills one person; in
each case, the victimization is limited. Id. at 432. Although terrorism is considered a
crime, it is distinguished from crime in that it seems irrational, in that it lacks obvious
motive, and the scale with which it is committed is much larger than crime. Id. at 431.
For example, the World Trade Center attacks were irrational in that they did not result in
financial gain or redress personal grievances. Id. Terrorism does not develop from personal matters, but from ideology. Id. at 432. Futhermore, terrorists differ from criminals
in that terrorists aim to cause as much death and injury as possible. Id. The harm inflicted
by a terrorist will almost certainly surpass harm attributable to any individual crime, as
terrorists often inflict generalized harm. Id. at 432–33. Real-world warfare is generally
easier than crime or terrorism to identify. Id. at 433. A state’s military launching an attack
on another state’s territory indicates that we have entered the theater of war. Id.
125. Graham, supra note 35, at 100–01 (“[A] state may lawfully resort to force when
acting in self-defense against an armed attack, provided it conforms to the customary
international law concepts of necessity and proportionality.”).
126. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 435. For example, figuring
out where an attack was launched from in the physical world is much more conclusive.
Id. The fact that a victim-state believes a cyberattack was launched from a particular state
is a consideration, but it carries much less weight online than it does in the physical
world. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 436.
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forcement and warfare to the military.129 One issue this separation
presents is that the response process may be delayed while respective
decision-makers attempt to determine the nature of a cyberattack.130 Decision-makers may also misunderstand the nature of an attack.131
The real-world indicators we rely on to determine the nature of an attack—point of attack origin, point of occurrence, and motive for an attack—are often lacking or unreliable in cyberattacks.132 Motive is a particularly distinguishing factor for cyberattacks.133 The problem arises
with a state’s ability to determine the motive behind a particular attack,134
and becomes especially challenging when no obvious motive exists.135
129. Id. This distribution of responsibility is generally carefully adhered to: “[c]ivilian
law enforcement does not respond to war and the military does not respond to crime.” Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Misunderstanding the nature of a cyberattack stems from both partitioned
responsibility and because we generally assume that crime is a “localized phenomenon.”
Id. at 437. For example, a cyberattack targeting a corporate computer system may be
inferred to be cybercrime, as we tend to assume that criminals target civilians. Id. at 436.
This conclusion would further be supported if the attackers’ behavior conformed to what
we expect to be criminal—extracting funds or personal information from corporate databases—and, as such, would likely be responded to by civilian law enforcement. Id. Those
inferences, however, could be wrong. The attack could just as easily be cyberwarfare. Id.
at 437. For example, China’s warfare strategy specifically focuses on attacking civilian
entities, including financial entities and infrastructure. Id.; see also U.S.-CHINA ECON. &
SEC.
REVIEW
COMM’N,
109th
Cong.
(2006),
available
at
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf (“China is actively
improving its non-traditional military capabilities . . . . China’s approach to exploiting the
technological vulnerabilities of adversaries extends beyond destroying or crippling military targets. Chinese military writings refer to attacking key civilian targets such as financial systems.”). Indeed, if we continue with the “civilian-attacks-are-crime” misinterpretation, we may begin to see serious consequences resulting from damage to financial
systems or infrastructure. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 437. The
same could be said of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare. Id. Cyberterrorist attacks usually
occur as a sequence of attacks which may be spatially and temporally separated. Id. As a
result, law enforcement may not consider that each attack is part of a larger, broader attack. Id. Thus, a response would likely be uncoordinated and isolated, with officers in
various locations responding differently to a large, singular threat. Id.
132. Id. at 437–38. As seen above, the importance of point of origination and point of
occurrence generally erode as attacks are launched online. Id. at 438.
133. Id. For example, profit is a likely motive for most cybercrime, ideology for cyberterrorism, and state enmity for cyberwarfare. Id.
134. Id. An example of this is the Titan Rain and Moonlight Maze cyberattacks. Id.
Titan Rain is the U.S. government’s designation for a series of coordinated cyberattacks
on American systems from 2003 to 2005. Thornburgh, supra note 107. The attacks were
tracked back to routers in China, but the identity of the hackers was never discovered. Id.
The hackers gained access to several sensitive U.S. networks including those at Lockheed
Martin, NASA, Redstone National, and Sandia National Laboratories. Id. Moonlight
Maze refers to a 1998 “incident in which U.S. officials accidentally discovered a pattern
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The scenario in which we will be unable to determine if a cyberattack
is a mere crime, a terrorist attack, or warfare presents the greatest challenges for the current response model under Article 51, and therefore
presents the greatest risks of unlawful retaliation for the injured state.136
Countries that partition response authority between civilian law enforcement and military agencies, like the United States,137 are particularly vulnerable to these risks.138 If responders cannot determine what kind of
of probing of computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, Energy Department, private
universities, and research labs . . . .”
Cyberwar!, PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2011). The cyberattack was traced back to the Soviet Union but the identity of the attackers was never discovered. Id. In both Titan Rain and Moonlight Maze we know what the
attackers did, but have not determined why they did it. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 438.
135. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. The motives behind
most cybercrime attacks are usually apparent—profit or revenge. Id. at 438. Cyberterrorists, however, in an effort to fund their real-world kinetic attacks have introduced us to
“mixed motive” scenarios: where the motive for a cybercrime is to profit, but the motive
for achieving financing is to engage in terrorism. Id. This scenario has very few implications in the development of a response and attack-attribution because civilian law enforcement is responsible for both crime and terrorism. Id.
136. Id. at 439.
137. Several federal U.S. statutes prohibit the comingling of partitioned authority. See
Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA Patriot Act,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1797–98 (2010). For example, the National Security Act of 1947
prohibits the CIA from employing “police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers” or
engaging in “internal security functions.” Id. at 1797 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403–4a(d)(1)
(2006)). The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally criminalizes using the military for
law enforcement functions. Id. at 1797–98 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)). The 1878
Act even reflects the idea that the military must remain subordinate to civilian law enforcement. Id. at 1798. In addition, the Privacy Act of 1974 promotes freedom from government inspection and the ability to monitor information about oneself. Id. However, a
narrow reading of the Act could even prevent federal civilian law enforcement agencies
from cooperating. Id.
138. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. This discussion is implicitly based on the United States’ current response authority model. Id. at n.277. This author is most familiar with the U.S. response model, which is considered the most extreme
model of partitioned response responsibility. Id. Response authority between law enforcement and the military is not as rigidly divided in some other countries. Id.; see also
DONALD E. SCHULZ, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE
FUTURE 37 (2000) (“As matters now stand, many governments feel they have no choice
but to bring the armed forces into law enforcement. The alternative is rampant criminality
and national insecurity.”). But see DANIELLA ASHKENAZY, THE MILITARY IN THE SERVICE
OF SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE DUAL-ROLE MILITARY 5 (Daniella
Ashkenazy ed., 1994) (“[T]he military in democratic societies ha[s] not been assigned a
role as a domestic law enforcement agency, with the exception of extreme circumstances
of insurrection or collapse of domestic public order beyond the capabilities of civilian
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cyberattack occurred or the severity of the effects,139 they may not be
able to correctly assume or assign responsibility to respond.140 This
leaves open the possibility that no response will result.141
Ultimately, the United States and countries with similarly segmented
response models could be targets of cyberterrorism or cyberwarfare, potentially facing dispersed attacks. Such nations may not realize the nature
of the attacks until extensive damage has incurred.142 Local law enforcement would likely focus on each separate, seemingly localized attack,
without appreciating the attack’s role as a small part of a larger attack.143
The possibility that the United States and similar countries could be subject to erratic and concerted cyberattacks by one or more organized
groups of nonstate actors is all too real.144 While the damage and loss of
police . . . .”). While militaries take on different roles at various times as perceived threats
change, armed forces in democracies are often defensive by nature. Id.
139. See, e.g., Barkham, supra note 39, at 84–93 (discussing cyberattacks and the distinction between use of force under Article 2(4) and mere coercion).
140. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. An example of this
would be a scenario in which intermittent, small-scale cyberattacks exploit the gap between Articles 2(4) and 51. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83. For instance, consider a scenario in which cyberattackers launched small-scale attacks in New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and Las Vegas. If the effects of the attacks were noticed, local law enforcement
would respond to each individual attack. The cyberattacks might appear as separate, uncoordinated attacks and each individual local law enforcement agency might not share
information or coordinate their responses. Local law enforcement would deal discretely
with each separate attack, unaware that they were responding to part of a larger attack.
Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439–40. Thus, where the intermittent,
small-scale cyberattacks might be sufficient to constitute an armed attack if viewed in the
aggregate, because of partitioned response responsibility, larger-scale Article 51 response
would not result. Id.
141. Id.; see also Jill R. Aitoro, Simulation Shows Government Lacks Policies Needed
(Feb.
16,
2010),
to
Respond
to
Cyberattack,
NEXTGOV.COM
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20100216_5378.php (simulation of a cyberattack
against the U.S.’s critical infrastructure demonstrated how the cascading effects can cripple networks and illustrated the government’s difficulty in responding). “As bandwidth
was overwhelmed, millions of infected cell phones were shut down, the Internet slowed
to a crawl and portions of the electric grid shut down as cyberattackers targeted a fictitious Web application electric utilities use to exchange bulk power service according to
demand. Transportation systems, the Stock Exchange and financial institutions were also
affected as networks failed.” Id. Panelist discussions included whether the federal government could declare the cyberattack an act of war, whether the president’s administration would be forced to respond by imposing martial law, and demanding that other countries cooperate with investigations. Id.
142. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439.
143. Id. at 439–40; see Arquilla, supra note 2 (fictional, but realistic, scenario of the
world’s first cyberwar launched by anonymous nonstate actors).
144. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440.
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life might not be as immediate as kinetic terrorism on a 9/11 scale, cyberattacks of these sort could be just as, if not more, devastating, especially
if recurring.145
The possibility of concerted cyberattacks by nonstate actors highlights
the problem with states’ segmented internal response authority in attackattribution.146 Civilian law enforcement and military personnel are extremely limited in their ability to collaborate in responding to attacks.147
States assume they will be able to maintain internal order with civilian
law enforcement and external stability with the military.148 We have
seen, however, that cyberspace erodes the validity of our real-world assumptions.149
D. Attribution Matters
Admittedly, determining attacker- and attack-attribution for cyberattack is a very difficult task.150 While prevention is permitted, its effectiveness is limited.151 Even with increased computer security, there is
little that a potential target can do to stop an assault coming in from
beyond its borders.152 Nonetheless, the United States and other U.N.
Member States have a continuing obligation to abide by the U.N. Charter
with “entire good faith and scrupulous care.”153 This allows victim-states
to retaliate only against states that have breached Article 2(4) by either
directly attacking the victim-state, exercising control over nonstate actors
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Professor Brenner attributes this to the “persistence of the internal-external
threat dichotomy.” Id. at 440. Historically, rules that are designed to maintain internal
order have not been implicated in a state’s efforts to resist external threats. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 45. Internal rules are simply not applicable to the
character and source of the outside threats. Id. Such rules are significant as they determine how a state will be able to use its resources on an external threat. Id. If a state is
experiencing internal disorder and devastation, it will likely be unable to focus such resources on fighting external threats. Id.
148. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440; Brenner, Toward a
Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 65–76.
149. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440. Physical proximity and
environment constraints, scale or number of “crimes” a person can commit in a given
period, and patterns of crime in the real-world are not applicable in cyberspace. Brenner,
Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 65–75.
150. Christopher E. Lentz, A State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist
Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 799, 813–16 (2010) (discussing “[a]ttribution and [i]ts
[i]mpossibly [h]igh [h]urdle”).
151. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83.
152. Id. at 83–84.
153. John R. Kennel, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 63 (2010).
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that have attacked the victim-state, or breaching their duty to prevent
nonstate actors from launching attacks within their territory.154 It also
requires that states limit their responses to fit within the principles of necessity and proportionality.155
While some types of cyberattacks will fit easily within the structure of
Articles 2(4) and 51,156 evaluating whether localized but widespread cyberattacks trigger the right to self-defense depends on the attacks’ effects
and frequency.157 Allowing states to respond without determining attacker- or attack-attribution might permit acts that would weaken the U.N.
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.158 Circumventing the rule of
attribution would allow beleaguered states too much autonomy in determining the scope and intensity of an appropriate response.159 Such practice would surely erode Article 51’s purpose of limiting the frequency
and scale of forceful self-defense to those rare times where it would be
appropriate.160
This applies with particular force to cyberattacks as the scope of the attack and the identity of the attacker are usually unknown or uncertain. In
the context of Article 51 self-defense, uncertainty is troublesome. Unless
a victim-state is able to conclusively determine attacker-attribution—that
is, which state is liable for failing to prevent an attack from being
launched within its territory—it may very well retaliate against an innocent state, resulting in unwarranted death and destruction.161 Furthermore, unless a state has fully determined the damage and effects inflicted
154. See discussion infra Part I.
155. Jensen, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Nicaragua, supra note 12).
156. Barkham, supra note 39, at 80. Attacks in which an enemy state’s obvious objective is complete and utter network debilitation; launching an evident all-out war resulting
in extensive destruction and significant loss of life; or a cyberattack that was a preliminary part of a kinetic attack would all likely be examples of armed attacks under Article
2(4) sufficient to trigger a right to self-defense under Article 51. Id. Note, however, that
while these examples are obvious enough to satisfy attack-attribution, attacker-attribution
remains unanswered.
157. Id. at 81.
158. Id. at 82. For example, states may attempt to justify the use of force on the
grounds that cyberattacks by an enemy state are constantly looming. Id. This justification
would seemingly allow for forceful self-defense at any time if the threat were always
impending. This runs contrary to the U.N. Charter’s express purpose of “maintain[ing]
international peace and security.” U.N. Charter.
159. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82.
160. Id.
161. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409. The widespread availability of computers and Internet access and the ability of cyberattackers to hide, disguise
their online personas, and use “stepping stones” make this especially true. Villers, supra
note 22, at 459–60.
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upon it by a cyberattack, any response based on uncertain or incomplete
information could result in disproportionate collateral damage or innocent civilian death.162 In either case, retaliation based on imperfect information or without conclusive attribution will likely result in a violation of Article 51.
Attribution is not only necessary to prevent unlawful responses; it is
necessary to ensure that some sort of response follows. Intermittent,
small-scale cyberattacks could take advantage of the gap between Articles 2(4) and 51.163 If cyberattacks are small enough, they might be
considered a use of force but not an armed attack significant enough to

162. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82. This applies to both kinetic and electronic responses. Id. An example of this occurred in 1988, in which an Iranian Airbus was accidentally shot down because it was believed to be a military plane, resulting in 290 civilian
deaths. Id. at 82–83; see also George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1179 (2000). Active defenses—electronic measures used
to trace an attack back to its source and “disrupt it”—are commonly considered the most
appropriate use of force against cyberattacks because they employ only necessary force
and cause less disproportionate collateral damage. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 79–80. The
problem with active defenses is that they are often engaged while a cyberattack is in
progress. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82. A targeted state may have responded in selfdefense without first determining the nature, scope, frequency, or effects of the attack.
Thus, because the state did not determine attack-attribution, it does not know whether the
initial cyberattack qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51. Furthermore, active defenses that shut down attacking computers could have unpredictable, cascading effects.
Id. at 83. For example, if an active defense counterattacked an attacking system, it could
penetrate an unmapped system. Id. Without mapping a system and knowing its contours,
the operator might not be able to distinguish military targets from civilian targets. Id.
Thus, without fully determining attack-attribution, the originally-targeted state could
violate Article 51 and the principles of necessity and proportionality. See Ruth Wedgwood, Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 227–30 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds.,
2002) (arguing that it is more difficult to restrict the effects of active defenses than with
kinetic weapons because connections from a target computer to the civilian infrastructure
it controls are less evident; also arguing that there is insufficient time to map attacking
systems when using active defenses, which could result in broad, unintended consequences). But see Michael Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the
Jus in Bello, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 204–05
(Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (arguing that active defenses
merely shut down attacking computer systems for a brief time, rather than using kinetic
weapons which cause widespread destruction to attain their objectives).
163. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83. In the previous section, there was discussion of
local law enforcement responding to local cyberattacks which are ultimately part of a
larger, coordinated attack. This is the other side of that coin—that is, uncoordinated cyberattacks insufficient in scope or character to qualify as an armed attack.
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trigger the victim’s right of self-defense under Article 51.164 In contrast, a
series of small-scale attacks might constitute an armed attack under Article 51, but local law enforcement might treat each attack as a separate
incident rather than parts of a larger attack.165 Although self-defense may
be appropriate in the latter example, no response would ensue as no one
would be aware of the larger attack.166 Therefore, in the context of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism, attribution matters. Attributing the origin of
a cyberattack and effects of an attack to a state are vital in complying
with the requirements of self-defense under international law. The pervasiveness of nonstate actors on the Internet and their ability to disguise
their tracks requires that the concept of attribution not only remain in
place, but be reinforced. Thus, in order to prevent innocent deaths and
collateral damage, “getting it right” is of extreme importance.
III. REINFORCEMENT OF ONLINE ATTRIBUTION
The main problems regarding online attribution are the lack of conclusive information and the need for absolute certainty. The anonymity of
the Internet and the ability to disguise one’s online persona create inherent difficulties in determining which state failed in its duty to prevent an
attack from being launched within its borders.167 Bifurcated response
authority makes it difficult for military and civilian law enforcement to
contemporaneously determine attack-attribution and coordinate a synchronized response.168 However, online state attribution is of such importance that it must not be circumvented. Instead of getting rid of state attribution, measures should be taken to reinforce or ease the process of
attributing a cyberattack to a state through increased cooperation and
sharing of information, externally among states and internally among
military and law enforcement personnel.169
164. Id. at 81. For example, if a series of small-scale incursions occur in another state’s
computer systems, causing few disruptions and minor damage, such incursions might not
constitute an armed attack. Id. It may be likened to a state sending its troops across
another state’s border without causing any significant damage. Id.
165. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439.
166. Id.
167. Villers, supra note 22, at 459–60.
168. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 441. Bifurcated response
authority requires military personnel to respond to external threats, including acts of war,
and law enforcement personnel to respond to internal threats, including crime and terrorism. Id. Further, civilians have no role in responding to crime or terrorism. Id. This response authority seems like a logical system probably because “it is all we know.” Id.
169. While this Note proposes that states should be required to share information with
other states and domestic law enforcement should share information with the military,
Susan Brenner takes this concept one step further. Id. at 465–74. Professor Brenner pro-
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While there is no silver bullet to solve the problems of online attribution, many different solutions have been proposed.170 Requiring states to
share information to conclusively determine attacker-attribution is consistent with the legal and practical limitations of state sovereignty, as the
duty to cooperate can be found in several sources.171 U.N. Member States
are already under an obligation “[t]o achieve international co-operation
in solving international problems . . . .”172 Multilateral informal cooperation between states would not require any additional treaty processes and
is crucial to the development of international cyberlaw.173 Thus, states
would not have any additional obligations placed on them; only reinforcement of an obligation that already exists.
A policy requiring internal state entities to cooperate and share information is consistent with legal and pragmatic constraints of the institutional separation of the military and law enforcement.174 Specifically, law
enforcement’s contribution to the military would be providing informa-

poses integration of civilians, the military, and law enforcement personnel. Id. at 465. She
suggests a voluntary organization to train and coordinate civilians in an attempt to support military and law enforcement efforts against cyberattacks. Id. at 469.
170. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Edward J. Giorgio, President,
Ponte Technologies) [hereinafter Planning for the Future]; see also Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal
Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSAT’L L. 57 (2010) (discussing giving every
state universal jurisdiction to prosecute cyberterrorists as a means of deterrence); Jeffrey
Hunker, U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: Five Issues That Won’t Go Away, 4
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 197 (2010) (discussing improving the governance structure of the Internet, building norms for online behavior for states and individual users,
and expanding multilateral cooperation against cybercrime).
171. Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, Principles of International Internet Law, 11
GERMAN L.J. 1245, 1259–60 (2010) (discussing the existing “[p]rinciple of [i]nterstate
[c]ooperation” in the context of internet law). For example, the duty of cooperation
among states is found in the U.N. Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on Cybercrime of 2001, to name a few. Id. at
1259.
172. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
173. Hunker, supra note 170, at 200; see, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp.
No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) (U.N. General Assembly Resolution reinforcing the principles of cooperation among states for the furtherance of international peace
and security).
174. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 469.
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tion about incidents that might constitute cyberwar, while the military
would provide law enforcement about cybercrime and cyberterrorism.175
While states should be required to share information to assist one
another in determining attacker- and attack-attribution, the rapidly evolving nature of technology may even render that obligation obsolete. The
trend in technology is moving towards embedding identification and location tags deep into infrastructure, which will be difficult to circumvent.176 Eventually, the infrastructure will provide authentication of the
person at the other end of the signal rather than the person operating it.177
However, until then, cyberattack attribution must remain in place.
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the necessity of retaining the concept of attribution in the context of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism, even though
some have called for its abolition.178 The proliferation and abundance of
computers and computer-related technologies has changed the safety and
legal landscapes in unprecedented ways.179 The widespread availability
of computers and Internet access provides an unparalleled number of
nonstate actors with the ability to launch cyberattacks on private, public,
and military systems anywhere in the world.180 International law, however, has evolved to hold states legally responsible for the acts of nonstate
actors.181 After the events of 9/11, international law grew to hold states
indirectly responsible if they provide any support to persons involved in
terrorist acts, including failure to prevent the launch of an attack.182

175. Id. The U.S. implemented the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which authorizes
the Department of Homeland Security to share cyber security information with state and
local governments, as well as private entities that maintain critical systems. Benjamin R.
Davis, Comment, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist Exploitation on the Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance, 15 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 119, 154 (2006).
176. Planning for the Future, supra note 170. New Internet protocols may also embed
characteristics such as personal identity, hardware identity, location, and institutional
affiliation. Id. A tag is a form of metadata, or a record of information, which captures the
basic characteristics of data, resources, and the user. Geospatial Metadata, FED.
GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMM., http://www.fgdc.gov/metadata (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
177. Planning for the Future, supra note 170.
178. Proulx, supra note 9, at 643–53.
179. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 474.
180. Villers, supra note 22, at 459–60.
181. Proulx, supra note 9, at 634–35.
182. Dantiki, supra note 83, at 655 (arguing that Resolution 1373 created a binding
obligation on states to reform domestic law in order to more appropriately fight international terrorism).
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Once an attack qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, a victim-state is permitted to retaliate in self-defense, provided that the response conforms to the principles of necessity and proportionality.183 Attribution in this context ensures that a victim-state responding in self-defense does not target innocent people or states and determines that the response is proportionate to the original attack.184 The
primary difficulty of attributing a cyberattack to a particular state is that
the characteristics of an online attack do not hold the same significance
as the characteristics of a kinetic attack.185 In particular, places do not
have any real value in online attacks because, although an attack may
have been routed through a particular location, it does not mean the attack originated from that location.186 Essentially anyone has the ability to
launch an anonymous transnational cyberattack.187 Determining the nature of an attack—and thus ensuring the response is proportional—is difficult because the indicators we rely on in real-world attacks—motive,
location of attack, physical evidence—do not always exist in cyberattacks.188 Bifurcated response authority and the ability of attackers to
launch small-scale attacks, which may create communication and coordination problems among the military and law enforcement, further complicate the issue.189
The inherent difficulty in cyberattack attribution highlights why the
concept of attribution is of extreme importance. The need for legal certainty requires that states attribute cyberattacks to the accurate state to
prevent innocent deaths and unnecessary collateral damage. As such, the
concept of online attribution should be reinforced through increased state
collaboration and sharing of information. Such a requirement does not
create any additional obligations on states. It is merely a reinforcement of
an existing obligation of cooperation. Eventually, the technology will
catch up with the law. Until then, the concept of cyberattack attribution
must endure.
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